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INTRODUCTION 




Although our central concern in this book is to explore the way in which migrants from Ind a, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh have set about making themselves at home in Britain, it is well worth 
remembering that immigration itself is anything but an unprecedented phenomenon. Throughout 
its history Britain has been a recipient of immigrant inflows, as with the Celts, Anglo-Sax ns and 
Normans in the relatively distant past, supplemented by the more recent arrival of substanti
numbers of Irish, Jewish and Eastern European settlers. Thus while the most recent wave of 
arrivals — in which migrant workers were drawn in from the Indian subcontinent and the islands 
of the Caribbean to fill the yawning gaps that emerged in the British labour market during the 
years of the post-war boom — is in some senses nothing but the latest episode in a long chain of 
developments, it has nevertheless brought about a profound and indeed irreversible change in the 
whole character of the British social order. First, Britain is now a visibly multi-racial society, in 
the sense that its citizens now include 2.7 million people who are either wholly or partly of non-
European ancestry. Secondly, and just as important, it has become a much more overtly poly-
ethnic society. Inspired as they are by cultural, religious and linguistic traditions whose roots lie 
far beyond the boundaries of Europe, the new minorities have significantly expanded the range 
of diversities covered by local British lifestyles. 
Nevertheless it seems doubtful that any of us — whether we belong to the white majority or 
the new visible minorities — have yet come fully to grips with the momentous implications of 
these developments. Although a careful reading of Britain’s past history could have provided 
plenty of evidence that immigration tends to have a long-term impact on the local social and 
cultural order, and although it is now nearly half a century since the inflow from South Asia and 
the Caribbean began, and more than twenty years since it reached its peak, remarkably little 
serious thought has yet been given to considering either the extent, or indeed the irreversibility, 
of the changes it has wrought. Paradoxically, it was for many years regarded as thoroughly 
alarmist — at least in liberal circles — even to consider the possibility that any such changes 
might occur at all. My own view; by contrast, is th t future historians may well conclude that the 
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impact of the arrival of South Asian and Afro-Caribbean settlers on the British social and 
cultural order will eventually prove almost as great as that precipitated by the arrival of William 
of Normandy in 1066. 
 Of course there are also many differences. South Asian and Afro-Caribbean migrants arrived 
as workers, not as rulers; hence although they also hoped to make their fortunes, their starting 
point was quite different. Most found they had little alternative but to accept manual employment 
in an industrial economy which subsequently went into rapid decline, clearly a far cry from their 
Norman predecessors’ privileged position as victorious conquerors. And while the Normans may 
have taken pride in their ancestry, neither they nor any of many other European migrant groups 
who arrived in Britain before or since were a visibl minority, quite unlike their South Asian and 
Afro-Caribbean successors. 
Nevertheless there are also some striking parallels between the adaptive strategies devised by 
these otherwise disparate groups. Just as the newly established Norman-French elite continued to 
draw inspiration from their own distinctive linguistic, religious, and cultural traditions for several 
generations after their arrival in England, so too does the current group of South Asian and Afro-
Caribbean settlers — as indeed did the Irish and Jewish migrants who arrived in even larger 
numbers in the late nineteenth century. And just as the religious, linguistic and cultural mpact of 
the Norman irruption eventually had a profoundly creative impact on the local social order, so 
there is every reason to expect that the consequences of the arrival of the latest group of migrants 
will be just as far-reaching. 
Even so, that process is still only at its earliest stage. As the growth of ever more dynamic 
ethnic colonies in most of Britain’s industrial towns and cities clearly demonstrates, all the new 
minorities are strongly committed to cultural and religious reconstruction. Nevertheless the 
minority impact on mainline social and cultural institutions has so far remained largely 
peripheral, and confined to a few specific areas, such as popular music, professional football, 
small retail outlets and the fast-food rade. What their presence has precipitated, however, is 
some intense hostility among Britain’s white natives.’ 
Right from the outset, non-European settlers found themselves subjected to racial 
exclusionism, and to this day skin-colour remains an inescapable social marker. Yet despite its 
widespread use as a trigger for exclusionary behaviour, physical appearance is of much less 
significance than it once was as a target of white hostility. Instead the focus has shifted to the 
minorities’ religious and ethnic distinctiveness. Besides being regarded as wholly unreasonable, 
their very ethnicity is widely perceived as presenting a dangerous and indeed unacceptable 
challenge to the established social and cultural order. 
Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Dimension 
There is of course much more that could be said about the logic and dynamics of racial and 
ethnic polarisation, and the way in which such tensions might be resolved, let alone about 
parallel developments elsewhere, both today and in the past. What is clear, however, is that the 
United Kingdom is by definition a multi-national society, even if it is one within which the 
English have long enjoyed a position of almost unquestioned hegemony. Likewise the charge 
that a minority ethnic presence constitutes an unacceptable threat to the religious and cultural 
integrity of the nation is in no way novel, since the growth of Irish Catholic and Jewish ethnic 
colonies precipitated equally great popular hostility.2 
Yet although we must always keep these wider issues in view —for they provide a constant 
backdrop to our discussion — the focus of this book is much narrower: it is restricted to those 
people, or rather those c mmunities, who trace their ancestral roots to one part or another of the 
Indian subcontinent. To that end it draws together eleven specially written ethnographic accounts 
exploring current processes of social, religious and cultural adaptation within a specific, and 
usually highly localised, British South Asian community. 
As befits an ethnographic account, we pay relativel little attention to the quantitative aspects 
of the South Asian presence, about which a growing body of statistical data can be found 
elsewhere. Our aim, instead, is to highlight the qualitative characteristics of the new South Asian 
settlements, and to emphasise that however similar all “Asians” may seem to outsiders, they 
actually constitute a far more diverse population category than is commonly realised. Even so, 
the accounts presented here are far from comprehensive: as readers will soon realise, that 
diversity is so great that we could not hope to encompass all its dimensions within a single 
volume. 
Nevertheless the accounts presented here are wide in range. They include an exploration of 
the experiences of Pakistani Muslims in both Oxford and Bradford; high-caste Punjabi Sikhs in 
Leeds; low-caste Valmikis in Coventry; Sylhetis in London’s East End; the growing popularity 
of Hindu devotional movements among emigrants from Gujarat; two caste-based Guj rati 
communities, Prajapatis in London and Mochis in Leeds; two more religiously-ba ed commun-
ities Jams in Leicester and Parsis in London; and last but not least the experiences of Indo-
Caribbean Hindu migrants from Trinidad and Guyana who have settled in London. Though by 
definition far from exhaustive, these accounts nevertheless highlight the most important 
dimensions of the South Asian presence in Britain, while also demonstrating how vigorous — 
and how varied — the processes of cultural reconstruction which they have set in train. 
A further consequence of our approach is that it serves to demonstrate the difficulty of making 
generalisations which apply with equal force to every section of Britain’s “Asian” population. 
Nor does moving down to the next level of differentiation — such as national origins — in 
search of a “community” about which to generalise necessarily constitute much of an advance. 
Thus while most people will fairly willingly identify themselves either as “Indians”, “Pakistanis” 
or “Bangladeshis” when asked to do so, it would be a great mistake to assume that those so 
identified will show any great degree of commonality among themselves, or that they will ever 
interact in a sufficiently coherent way to merit being described as a community. 
Far from it. If one regards a community as a body of people whose feelings of mutual 
identification are strong enough to precipitate an active and ongoing sense of solidarity, the great 
majority of Britain’s ethnic colonies rest on much more parochial foundations than is commonly 
supposed. Thus while common religious affiliation —whether to Hinduism, Sikhism or Islam — 
has undoubtedly proved a far more effective vehicle for large-scale mobilisation than mere 
nationality, such solidarities have still tended to be relatively short- ived, and linked to specific 
issues, such as the Satanic Verses affair. In contrast the networks of reciprocity which provide 
the framework for most settlers’ everyday lives are largely grounded in much narrower loyalties 
of caste, sect and descent-group. Hence if we are to make sense of their preferred strategies we 
need to take careful note of what jati and biraderi membership entails. It is only then that one 
can begin to understand why these loyalties have been such an effective fou dation for the 
networks of reciprocity which lie at the heart of any sense of community. 
Yet although we have therefore sought to highlight both the detail and the increasingly varied 
character of British South Asian lifestyles, we are also committed to teasing out the common 
elements which underlie this variety. Our aim is therefore to identify the adaptive strategies 
which all South Asian settlers, regardless of their precise affiliation, have devised as a means of 
coping with their new environment, for despite the dangers of reckless generali atio , it is 
possible to identify a number of common elements behind what might appear at first sight to be 
ever-burgeoning diversity. Thus even though we do indeed focus on specific communities, our 
aim is not just to pile up ever more detailed descriptions of one little group after another, but 
rather to develop an analytical perspective on the ways in which those involved have settled 
down and made themselves at home in Britain. 
This takes us straight back into the choppy waters of the issues raised right at the outset. 
Contrary to the expectations of most of Britain’s white natives, settling down has not taken the 
form of a comprehensive process of assimilation, or even an approximation to it. Thus, as every 
subsequent chapter shows, both the older generation of settlers and their British-born offspring 
are continuing to find substantial inspiration in the resources of their own particular cultural, 
religious and linguistic inheritance, which they are actively and creatively reinterpreting in order 
to rebuild their lives on their own terms. Hence, among other things, the title we have chosen. 
Why Desh Pardesh? At first the phrase is unlikely to make much impact. Few readers, except 
those of South Asian origin themselves, will be familiar with either Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi, 
Gujarati or Bangla, even though these are now widely-spoken British languages. However as 
speakers of any of these tongues will already appreciate, the phrase Desh Pardesh has a double 
meaning, for it can equally well be translated both as “h me from home” and as “at home 
abroad”. As such it sums up the central theme of this book: despite the many obstacles they have 
encountered, Britain’s De h Pardeshis still remain strongly committed to the pursuit of their own 
self-determined goals. 
The Growth of the South Asian Presence in Britain 
Although our principal concern in this book is to explore the qualitative char c er of Britain’s 
South Asian ethnic colonies, at least some mention of their quantitative dimensions is clearly 
also required, if only because public debate on this subject is often as ill-informed as it is heated. 
Although a large-scale South Asian presence is very much a post-war phenomenon, its history is 
very much longer, for a small number of adventurers had begun to find th ir way to Britain in the 
seventeenth century.3 Occasional visitors continued to arrive thereafter, but once seamen began 
to be hired in Bombay and Calcutta to serve on British steamships, numbers increased. By the 
end of the nineteenth century small settlements of Indian seamen awaiting reemployment could 
be found in most of Britain’s major ports,4 and hese in turn served as bridgeheads through which 
the subsequent large-scale inflow was organised. 
Mass migration was dependent on plentiful employment o portunities, which only became 
available after the end of the Second World War. Thereafter the inflow from the subcontinent 
began to escalate rapidly. From the early 1 950s until the end of the I 970s, the British economy 
was acutely short of labour. The post-war boom was proceeding apace, but reservoirs from 
which additional workers had been recruited during previous periods of expansion — Ireland d 
Eastern Europe — could no longer satisfy its demands. Hence migrant workers began to be 
drawn in from uch further afield, especially from the islands of the Caribbean and from the 
Indian subcontinent. 
The subsequent growth of Britain’s South Asian population has been affected by many 
factors, including the boom, and then in the 1980s the equally rapid decline in the demand for 
unskilled industrial labour; the imposition of ever more draconian immigration rules, which 
primarily targeted people of non-Eur pean descent; the arrival of British passport-holders of 
South Asian origin from Britain’s newly-independent colonies in East Africa; the reunion of 
families, as wives came with their children to join their husbands; and, most recently of all, the 
emergence of a burgeoning British-born second generation. 
Tracing the precise growth pattern of Britain’s South Asian population poses a number of 
problems, for it was not until 1991 that a properly posed ethnic question was included in the 
Census. Hence the figures in the final column of Table 1.1 can be regarded as broadly reliable, 
while those to the left of them ar  the best available estimates for the three previous decades. 
Although South Asians still only make up a small proportion of the population as a whole, their 
total numbers have grown rapidly since the early 1950s. At the outset growth was largely a 
consequence of further immigration, but since the imposition of ever-tighter controls on 
settlement from the mid-1960s onwards, the South Asian inflow has steadily declined, and has 
now been reduced to little more than a trickle. This has not halted population growth, however, 
mainly because of the demographic characteristics of this section of the population. Most South 
Asian migrants arrived in Britain as young adults, and their inflow reached its peak in the late 
l960s, with the result that it is still only the early pioneers who have reached retirement ag . But 
if South Asian pensioners are still few, the pattern is reversed at the other end of the age 
spectrum. Not only did most settlers first arrive as young adults, but their families tended to be 
relatively large, with their wives sustaining this higher rate of fertility following their arrival in 
Britain. All the indications are that fertility rates are now declining sharply, especially among the 
rising British-born generation. Even so, Britain’s South Asian population is now so heavily 
skewed towards youth that substantial growth is inevitable, if only because births will 
substantially outnumber deaths for many years to come. It can therefore be predicted that 
Britain’s South Asian population will eventually stabilise at roughly twice its present size.5 
Table 1.1. GROWTH OF BRITAIN’S SOUTH ASIAN POPULATION 
Country of birth/ethnicity6 1961 1971 1981 1991 
India 81,400 240,730 673,704 823,821 
Pakistan 24,900 127,565 295,461 449,646 
Bangladesh7 — — 64,562 157,881 
East Africa8 — 44,860 181,321 — 
Total South Asian population 106,300 413,155 1,215,048 1,431,348 
% South Asians in U.K. population 0.23% 0.85% 2.52% 3.04% 
 
Sources. 1961: E.J.B. Rose (ed.), Colour and Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 1969), p.97. 
1971, 1981 and 1991: O.P.C.S. Census Reports, London H.M.S.O. 
 
 
Yet even if that prediction proves correct, South Asians would still only make up some 6% of 
the total population, far short of the “swamping” level which some alarmists have predicted. 
Even so, the national average obscures much local variation, for the South Asian population is by 
no means evenly distributed. Rather its members are still heavily concentrated in those towns 
and cities which experienced acute labour shortages during the l960s and l970s — i.e. London, 
the industrial Midlands, and the textile towns on either side of the Pennines; and within each of 
those areas, South Asian settlers are further concentrated in particular residential localities, 
usually — although not alwys — in inner-city areas. In these contexts their presence is much 
more prominent. In both Birmingham and Bradford, for example, nearly a quarter of all school 
entrants are now of South Asian descent, and in certain neighbourhoods they form the over-
whelming majority. Hence in the areas which the settlers have made their own, Desh Pardesh is 
much more than a social and cultural expression: it has also become a spatial reality. 
Many of Britain’s white natives undoubtedly view the rapid growth of such ethnic colonies 
with alarm, particularly when they emerge in or close to the neighbourhoods in which they 
themselves once lived. Nor are their fears assuaged by well-m aning but increasingly threadba  
arguments that such developments are nothing but a temporary w y-station in a more long-term 
process of assimilation. That thesis is no longer valid. Like it or not, Britain has been changed, 
and decisively so, as a consequence of post-war immigration. 
Yet just what has changed? There is of course a visible difference: sev ral million of Britain’s 
inhabitants have the kind of skin colour which its white natives would like to acquire on 
expensive tropical holidays, but would be horrified to inherit. But while that difference is 
literally only skin-deep, the changes precipitated by the new minorities’ ethnicity — that is their 
commitment to their own religious, linguistic, and cultural traditions — have been far more 
fundamental. Since their ethnicity is intrinsic to their very being, the resultant loyalties are a 
major resource in the construction of survival strategies: hence they are unlikely to be 
abandoned. If this is so, it follows that short of comprehensive ethnic cleansing — whi h one 
hopes is not an option — othing can alter the fact that the new minoritieshave become an 
integral part of the British social order, and they have done soon their own terms. Hence the 
underlying challenge is simple: how — and how soon — can Britain’s white natives learn to live 
with difference, and to respect the right of their fellow-cit zens to organise their lives on their 
own preferred terms, whatever their historical and geographical origins? 
We do not suggest that responding to this challenge will be easy: indeed, given the cultural 
impact of Britain’s imperial past, it is likely to be exceedingly difficult. It is the aim of this book 
to help readers confront these issues and find some answers to them.  
The Dilemmas of Migration   
Nevertheless our central concern here is not with white sensitivities, but rather with the settlers’ 
experiences, and in this context it is worth emphasising that however much alarm their arrival 
may have caused among Britain’s white majority, they themselves found the experience yet more 
perplexing, confronted as they were by what seemed to be a never-ending series of puzzles, 
contradictions and dilemmas. These often started from the moment migrants planned their 
departure, sharpened with their arrival overseas, and grew more complex the longer they stayed 
away. Thus even the most well-settled may suddenly find themselves faced with irresolvably 
contradictory pressures, as when they have to balance their obligations to care for ageing parents 
in the subcontinent against an equally strong commitment to support their British-based 
offspring. Likewise their children may face equally intractable dilemmas as they seek to balance 
their obligation to fulfil their parents’ expectations of respect and support against the contrary 
imperatives arising from their involvement in a much wider British world. 
Such dilemmas become more poignant when migrants find that despite all their new 
opportunities, they still remain aliens at their destination. No matter how bad the social and 
material conditions they may have left behind, and no matter how great their achievements 
abroad, migrants invariably feel a grievous sense of loss. They miss — and therefore long once 
again to experience — the familiar sights, sounds and smells of their birthplace, and the warmth 
and conviviality of everyday domestic life. All of them yearn for closer contact with their now-
distant kin, and for closer involvement with the linguistic, cultural and religious world which 
once gave comprehensive meaning and purpose to their everyday lives; no wonder, therefore, 
that most make every effort to constru t a more meaningful world in their otherwise alien 
destination. 
A Flight from Poverty? 
Yet if the social and emotional costs of migration were so great, why did so ma fly settlers come 
to Britain in the first place? Material inequality was undoubtedly a spur; unless the financial 
rewards to which they might gain access are very tempting, the counter-attraction of the known 
and familiar will never be overcome. Even so, long-distance migrants are rarely drawn from the 
poorest families, and for good reason. Migration is above all an entrepreneurial ctivity, in 
which success usually depends on making substantial initial investment, so that those with 
minimal social and financial assets cannot 
hope to get very far. Overseas travel strains the resources of even th  most prosperous of Indian 
villagers, so overseas migration is normally way beyond the means of the landless poor: for them 
buying a railway ticket to Dhaka, Bombay or Karachi is the only realistic way of finding 
employment elsewhere. Overseas migr nts are therefore usually drawn from families of middling 
status, whose members are neither sufficiently prosperous to be wholly content with their lot, nor 
so poor as to be unable to afford the migrant’s ticket, passport and visa. 
Much the same is trueof the particular areas in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh from which 
most migrants have come. While some parts of the subcontinent do indeed suffer from the 
grinding poverty of popular stereotypes, this is far from true in the three regions from which the 
vast majority of Britain’s South Asian settlers have been drawn — Punjab, straddling the border 
between India and Pakistan in the north-west; Gujarat, on the western seacoast north of Bombay; 
and Sylhet District in north-eastern Bangladesh. Punjab and Gujarat are both noted for their 
agricultural prosperity; Sylhet might seem at first sight to conform more closely to the 
stereotype, given its location in poverty-stricken Bangladesh, but this does not stand up to closer 
examination. 
First, Bengal has not always been in its present parlous economic condition. Its fabled wealth 
made it an early target of the East India Company, and its current penury must therefore be seen 
in the context of a long history of British colonial exploitation, more recently compound d by 
rapid population growth. Secondly, as Gardner and Shukkur show in their chapter, the marked 
concentration of emigration in Sylhet District was not a consequence of the Sylhetis’ greater 
poverty, but rather of a historical anomaly which made cultivators in the District the owners 
rather than mere tenants of their land. This highlig t  a further major characteristic of South 
Asian migration to Britain: whether Punjabi, Gujarati or Sylheti, the majority of settlers are from 
peasant farming families. Not only did this mean that they were people who had proudly and 
autonomously owned and cultivated the land from which they made their living, but the sense of 
psychological and financial independence which this status gave them has proved crucial to thei 
success both as migrants and settlers.
Not all migrants were peasant farmers, however. Some were craftsmen, and the inflow also 
included a small but significant leaven of urbanites who were much more likely to have 
commercial skills and/or professional qualifications. Migration to Britain has therefore in no way 
been a means of escaping destitution. Most of the urbanites saw the move as a step towards 
career advancement, and although the peasants were undoubtedly attracted by the money they 
could earn inBritain, they did not seek access to this new source of wealth to meet their families’ 
everyday expenses; that came from the land. Employment overseas was more usually the means 
of supplementing the family’s capital resources: the migrant’s savings would be invested in 
building a new house, buying more land or a tractor, installing a tube-well, or providing a 
daughter or a sister with a larger and more attractive dowry. Hence the initial objective of most 
migrants, especially the peasant-farmers, was to raise their family’s standing in the local social 
hierarchy. 
Migration and Kinship 
In such a context migration is a far less individualistic activity than is often supposed. First, few 
left without the active support of their extended families, who often provided th  migrant with 
his ticket, passport and visa. Secondly, most migrants regarded their continued membership of 
their extended families as axiomatic. Not only did they expect to share the fruits of their labour 
with the group as a whole, but their physical absence had little impact on their position in their 
extended family. Even if they returned penniless (which heaven forbid), it was taken for granted 
that they would and should immediately resume all the social roles and rights which they had 
enjoyed before they left. 
Nor was this the only way in which kinship reciprocities had a major impact on the migratory 
process. As Shaw’s account of the Pakistani settlement in Oxford shows, only a tiny minority of 
newcomers arrived in Britain as lone adventurers wi h no prior contacts whatsoever. Of course 
the very earliest pioneers must indeed have done so long ago. But this phase did not last long. 
Having established themselves, each of these early pioneers soon became a bridgehead through 
which the entry of a whole stream of kinsmen and fellow-villagers was facilitated. Hence the 
vast majority of migrants arrived not as unconnected individuals, but in cascading chains along 
increasingly well-worn paths of kinship and friendship. These processes have had a 
comprehensive impact on patterns of settlement. As the following chapters show in abundance, 
chain migration has given Britain’s South Asian settlements a far more parochial character than 
most outsiders are aware, for specific and highly localised castes, sects and kinship groups in the 
subcontinent have given rise to — and are now umbilically linked with — equally tightly 
structured British-based ethnic colonies. 
From Sojourners to Settlers 
Despite the material advantages to which they gained access as a result of going to Britain, few 
rural migrants at first envisaged that they might become permanent settlers. Indeed since their 
aim was above all to earn and save as much as possible as quickly as possible before returning 
home, they could at that stage best b d cribed as sojourners rather than settlers. Had that initial 
objective remained unchanged, the South Asian presence in Britain would have develope very 
differently. But that was not to be. While a few sojourner  did return once they had met their 
initial financial targets, the vast majority stayed on much longer. At first this delay could be 
interpreted as only a temporary deferral of their original goal, to save just a little bit more. But 
just as many other migrant groups in a similar position the world over have discovered — not 
least the native English as they built up their own vast overseas diaspora — such a habit can turn 
addictive. So too the South Asian sojourners: the longer they stayed, the more rooted and at ease 
they felt in their new British environment. 
Although few ceased to dream about returning home permanently, many began to enjoy the 
greater personal autonomy they enjoyed in Britain, as well as the steadily increasing influence 
their new-found role as wealth-producers gave them within their extended families. From the 
1960s onwards the cost of air travel fell sharply, so regular visits back home became much 
easier. This was a major boon. It allowed migrants to re-establish face-to-face contact with their 
families, to oversee the investment of their savings, and above all to savour some of the fruits of 
their labours as unskilled manual workers in a wet, dirty, and far-away world. But if cheap 
tickets allowed them to make much more frequent visits to the world they valued most, they also 
made it far easier to return for another spell on the treadmill. Little by little and almost unaware 
of it themselves, transient sojourners were undergoing a metamorphosis: they were gradually 
being transformed into more or less permanent settlers. 
Yet the further along the route they went, the more their dilemmas were compounded. Years 
of residence abroad made them ever more aware of their alienation from the warmth and 
conviviality of family life, for even though visits back home were now much easier to ake —
and often became extended holidays of a year or more —each round-trip made them more 
poignantly conscious of the extent of their sacrifice, most heart-rendingly so when dearly loved 
and much remembered children failed even to recognise their l ng-absent fathers. 
Meanwhile migrants’ experience of Britain was also changing fast. As numbers grew rapidly 
during the 1950s and ‘60s, chain migration led to the reconstitution of large parts of many 
sojourners’ kinship networks, so that many of those who lived nearby, and alongside whom they 
worked in the mill or foundry, were either kinsmen or fellow villagers. Hence rather than being a 
social and cultural no-man’s-land, as it had been at first, Britain — or rather those parts of each 
industrial city into which they had been drawn by the demands of the labour market — was 
gradually becoming an arena for ethnic colonisation, as all the human material needed to support 
such an enterprise was converging within it.9 This was welcome, for it made Britain a less alien 
place in which to live. But it also opened up a new dilemma: had Britain become an arena 
suitable for the resumption of family life? Attractive as that prospect might be, many sojourners 
were still sceptical. 
Settlers’ Perceptions of the Lifestyles of the Native English 
From their perspective, Britain was a country riddled with contradict ons. Materially, there was 
much to recommend it: living standards were substantially higher than in the subcontinent, and 
despite the ever-present blight of racial exclusionism, free access to health care and education 
was much appreciated. Even so, these obvious benefits had to be set against the sojourners~ 
unanimous view that local moral values had little to recommend them. The English might be 
well-off materially, but the more migrants saw of their white neighbours’ lifestyles, their 
standards (or lack of them) of personal hygiene, the apparent absence of any sense of personal 
dignity, and the individualism and hedonism of their everyday lives, the more scandalised they 
became. 
In their own scheme of things, such values were absolutely crucial. Not to maintain a sense of 
izzat (personal honour) was to ignore an essential aspect of human dignity, while to ignore the 
emotional and material reciprocities due within the extended family was to pass up one’s most 
fundamental obligations. Yet the native English appeared to have no such concerns. As the 
sojourners saw it — and most of those who have since settled down permanently see little need 
to change their opinions — people who expected that their sons and daughters should become 
financially self-supporting (and therefore socially autonomous) the moment they left school 
lacked any serious sense of family life. It also appeared that their children were never taught to 
behave with any sense of honour or respect — hence their tendency to behave like farmyard 
animals flaunting their bodies, and kissing and cuddling on the street. Nor was their treatment of 
elderly people any better: far from treating their elders with r spect, they appeared to be figures 
of fun, and were bundled off into oblivion in old people’s homes when they ceased to be able to 
look after themselves. As for izzat, the English seemed to lack all comprehension of what it 
meant. From all of this the ojourners drew the obvious inference. This was not a culture worthy 
of emulation, nor one to whose corrupting influence their nearest and dearest should be expos d. 
If this was not enough, they reached similar conclusions over matters of personal hygiene. 
Thus while the white majority were (and are) all too ready to perceive migrants as “dirty” 
because of unfamiliar cooking smells and their preference for eating with their fingers instead of 
knives and forks, migrants’ judgements of native English practices were far more scathing. For 
them, people who used toilet paper and not water to clean themselves, who rejected showers in 
favour of infrequent baths, and who even failed to wash after sexual activity were manifestly 
uncivilised and quite beyond the pale. 
Survival in an Alien World 
While such perceptions enabled the settlers to draw a clear boundary between themselves and 
their white neighbours, and thus reinforced their sense of ethnic solidarity, they nevertheless 
generated further dilemmas. If the surrounding social order was based on values so antithetical to 
their own, how could they hope to survive within it —espec ally in the longer term? 
The reactions of the early pioneers are easy to describe. Because their families were not with 
them, their own exposure to local values was not regarded as particularly dangerous, since they 
saw themselves as having fallen only temporarily among barbarians. In deed like many other 
expatriates — such as Europeans working on contract in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf — they took 
great pride in their capacity to survive despite having to let everything they really valued fall 
temporarily into abeyance. Saving was their only goal, since the more swiftly their bank balances 
grew, the sooner they could return to a world where the fruits of their labour could be sensibly 
enjoyed. Given this frame of mind, it is easy to see why sojourners were prepared to work long 
hours: twelve-hour shifts six or even seven days a week were quite normal, especially in. the 
early days. And if shift work on this scale maximised earnings, crowding together into all-mal  
households where a day and a night shift worker might even share the same bed made equal 
sense: expenditure was minimised. While no-one regarded this as a “proper” way to live and 
work, it nevertheless provided the quickest way of getting back to a land where civilised 
behaviour could be resumed.10 
Yet contrary developments were taking place at the same time. As the inflow continued, chain 
migration brought kinsmen and fellow villagers together in ever larger residential and 
occupational clusters. And just as their own networks of reciprocity had facilitated the initial 
process of migration, so they also offered sojourners an equally positive means of surviving 
adversity, all the more s  since the outside English world was so hostile and alien. Thus even 
though it had been no part of their initial plan, they gradually began to reconstruct a familiar 
social order around themselves, complete with all its associated cultural norms. All of a sudden 
conformity mattered. Behaviour which had previously passed without comment — as when 
lonely men sought comfort and relief with local prostitutes — ceased to be regarded as 
reasonable. Instead a very different tendency emerged. As conventional norms were re-
established, deviance invited criticism and ridicule. Those who mimicked English ways too 
closely began to be accused of being be-izzat— without honour. Desh Pardesh was beginning to 
emerge. 
Family Reunion 
Since each settlement had become an arena within which honour could be sustained, life within it 
was transformed. The maintenance of personal and familial honour was of great concern to every 
migrant, especially since the need to restore their family’s good standing in the local social 
hierarchy by increasing its material resources had often been the original spur to migration itself. 
From this perspective izzat emerges not as something fixed and permanent, but as a matter of 
relative standing which generates cons ant competition, both between individuals and even more 
between closely related families. It follows that as soon as competition for izzat takes o f, there 
can be no escape: anyone who fails to play the game will by definition lose face. Hence the 
emergence of Britain as an arena fo st tus competition soon brought about a radical trans-
formation of sojourners’ lifestyles, because an ever higher premium gradually began to be placed 
on moral conformity. 
This changed everything, for now at long last migrants began to regard the resumption of 
family life in Britain as a realistic possibility. But they did so not because they had begun to take 
a more positive view of local cultural conventions, but rather because of a growing confidence 
that it was possible to recreate a fully moral social universe in Britain. Today such a conclusion 
might seem unexceptional, given the scale and success of Britain’s many South Asian ethnic 
colonies; but for the early pioneers it was a major leap of faith. Moreover, given the far-r aching 
implications of the decision, it was not a step which every group took at the same speed. English 
lifestyles and moral conventions were still viewed as negatively as always, and it was precisely 
because of the threat which these were held to pose to their own most deeply-held values that the 
more cautious groups concluded that family reunion could not be justified; and had they been 
right, family reunion would indeed have been a disaster. Hence the more pessimistic groups — 
most of them Muslim — remained very doubtful about the wisdom of the whole enterprise long 
after the more easygoing communities had taken the decisive step.” 
Changing Patterns of Investment and Expenditure 
Whether the move towards family reunion took place quickly or slowly, the arrival of wives and 
children rapidly transformed the character of each community. Almost immediately, the all- ale 
households which had been so prominent in the earlier period broke up, as settlers bought 
separate houses to accommodate their families. But although real kinship replaced quas-k nshi  
as the basis of domestic life, intense frugality remained the cornerstone of most families’ 
financial strategies. Hence they preferred to buy cheap terraced houses in run-down ar as, and to 
equip with a minimum amount of furniture, itself often secondhand. While to outside observers it 
often seemed that the settlers were too deprived and poverty-stricken to do any better, they 
themselves often saw things differently: their preferred lifestyles reflected their determination to 
save, despite the much greater cost of maintaining a family in Britain. 
Even so, buying and furnishing a house, even on this basis, was a radical change in financial 
strategy, since the proportion of their income they could save dropped sharply. Moreover, as 
time passed, they gradually began to spend more on enhancing their local standard of living. The 
first step was usually to turn the front room into a comfortably and relatively expensively 
furnished baithak where guests could be entertained in style: as always, enhancing the family’s 
izzat was a central priority. Thereafter change became ever more pervasive. Most families 
installed a telephone to keep in touch with kin, and a VCR to watch Hindi movies. Many then 
refurbished and redecorated their properties (often wth the help of Local Authority improvement 
grants, of which they took more advantage than most), before finally buying new furniture, 
laying down fitted carpets, and installing central heating. Last but not least, the more affluent 
families began to abandon the inner-city areas, where initial settlement had invariably occurred, 
in favour of more expensive suburban properties. 
As this went on, the rate at which they were able to put money aside dropped sharply, as did 
their propensity to remit — much to the alarm of kin back home. Yet although sojourners-turned-
settlers were now by their own standards behaving in an increasingly profligate way, their 
overall financial strategies were still broadly in keeping with their original objectives, but were 
certainly much more frugal than those of their white neighbours. Thanks to their peasant origins, 
they remained strongly committed to social and financial autonomy, and refused to be seduced 
by the credit-driven expectations of consumer capitalism. Hence they placed a high premium on 
property ownership, and regarded all forms of tenancy — even if the landlord was a Local 
Authority — as humiliating. They took an equally negative view of indebtedness, so when 
terraced houses in so-called “slums” could be bought for no more than a few hundred pounds —
as was possible in many industrial cities right up to the late 1960s —many seized the opportunity 
to do so, often cash down. Since then property prices have spiralled upwards, leaving little 
alternative to taking out a mortgage, but even so their commitment to capital accumulation 
remained intense. Anyone who paid off a loan before its due date was much admired. Everyday 
household finances were also just as frugally organised: not only was hire-purchase avoided like 
the plague, but extended families took every possible advantage of economies of scale: all but 
the most perishable of food was — and still is — bought by the gross, sack or box.’12 
The Reconstruction of Social and Religious Institutions 
As sojourners became settlers, so their lifestyles changed — although this was largely a matter of 
their revising, rather than abandoning, their initial aims and objectives. They remained almost as 
frugal as ever, even if Britain, rather than their home village, became the principal arena of 
saving and capital investment. And as settlers began to put down local roots, they made vigorous 
efforts to rebuild almost every aspect of their social and cultural traditions. Thus while religious 
observance had previously slid into abeyance, family reunion soon precipitated a resurgence in 
this area. Indeed, as every subsequent chapter shows, shared religious and sectarian 
commitments have for the most part proved to be the catalyst around which most South Asian 
communities have coalesced. Hence as numbers grew, a network of mosques, gurdwaras and 
mandirs began to spread across the country, each attracting an ever larger and more committed 
congregation. 
The rapid re-establishment of religious institutions, and the growing vi ur of izzat-
competition, had a major impact on the behaviour of settlers, who found themselves under 
growing pressure to conform (or at least give the appearance of conforming) to the ideal norms 
of their own particular group. Former pleasures — such as smoking, drinking, a d occasional 
adventures with white women — were now perceived as shameful and dishonourable. Sikhs 
began to regrow their hair and readopt the turban, Muslims to forswear alcohol, and many 
Hindus to become more strictly vegetarian. 
Another major consequence of family reunion was that life-cycle rituals, especially those 
associated with marriage and birth, could now be celebrated in Britain. The implications of this 
development were far-re ching. Large numbers of guests are invited to such celebrations, which 
therefore become important arenas for social interaction. And besides the fact that they are joyful 
events, the elaborateness with which they were celebrated had always been the central means 
whereby families competed to secure and advance their relative izzat. Thus from simple 
beginnings, marriage and births came to be celebrated in an ever more elaborate way: in every 
community rituals have grown longer and more complex, and the scale of gift-giving larger. 
Hence the cost of participation has steadily esc lated, leading to what can only be described as 
conspicuous consumption among the most affluent and firmly rooted communities.’13 Nothing 
more clearly confirms the settlers’ commitment to ethnic colonisation than these developments. 
Difference and Diversity 
Yet although all the various components of Britain’s South Asian population have been involved 
in these processes of ethnic colonisation, and thus in the construction of their own D sh Pardesh, 
their trajectories of adaptation have varied greatly. Hence while the accounts presented in this 
volume reveal many common features, they also highlight how much South Asian communities 
differ from each other, and that many of those differences were established during the process of 
migration itself. Thus while chain migration facilitated ethnic colonisation by bringing kinsmen 
together in specific neighbourhoods, it also generated differentiation, since each cascading 
stream brought migrants from a specific region, caste and community to an equally specific 
location in Britain. While all the new arrivals had to cope with similar forms of racial and ethnic 
exclusionism, it was above all to the specific resources of their own group that they looked for 
inspiration as they set about devising strategies for surv val. The results of all this are now 
becoming obvious. Since each little group of settlers rebuilt its life around their own religious, 
cultural and linguistic resources, and since the precise character of these resources varied 
enormously from group to group, so too have the ways — and the speed — with which they have 
adapted to their new environment. 
First and foremost, the migrants were very varied in their g ograp ical origins. Leaving those 
who arrived as “twice-migrants” from elsewhere in the diaspora to one side for a moment, the 
vast majority of direct migrants came from just three relatively compact geographical regions in 
Punjab, Gujarat, and finally from Sylhet District in Bangladesh (see maps, pp. xvi and xvii). Of 
the three, Punjab has provided by far the largest inflow, for around two-thir s of Britain’s South 
Asians are of Punjabi ancestry.’14 Even so Punjabis are not a homogeneous group. Although as 
regards language, behaviour and culture they have much in common, religious and caste 
differentiation has increased sharply during the past century. Hence Independence in 1947 was 
accompanied by a vicious process of religious and ethnic polarisation. Several hundred thousand 
people died, and the killing only stopped after several million Hindus and Sikhs living in areas 
allocated to Pakistan took refuge in India, while a similar number of Muslims in east Punjab fled 
west to Pakistan.’15 
Of the Punjabis in Britain, rather less than half are from the Indian side of the border, and of 
these the great majority are from the central and eastern parts of the Jullundur Doab. Most Indian 
Punjabis are Sikhs, although perhaps a quarter are Hindus; and while the great majority of the 
Pakistani Punjabis are Muslims, they also include a small Christian minority, most of whom are 
of Untouchable descent.’6 No less than their Indian counterparts, Britain’s Punjabi Muslim 
settlers are also predominantly of rural origin, and once again with specific regional 
concentrations. As many as two-thirds originate from the Potohar region south-west of 
Rawalpindi, especially from Mirpur District in Azad Kashmir. The remainder trace their roots 
either to the Chhach District (formerly known as Campbellpur), the city of Lahore, or the canal 
colonies of northern and central Punjab.
Gujarat has been the next most important source of immigrants, and roughly a quarter of 
British Asians have Gujarati connections of some kind. As in Punjab, the social order in Gujarat 
is deeply divided by religion, so although Hindus form the majority of Gujarati settlers in 
Britain, they also include a significant Muslim minority. Moreover, as Dwyer shows, Gujaratis 
have a long history of emigration to both Africa and the Middle East, so as many as half of 
Britain’s Gujaratis have East African connections of some sort. Over and above all this the 
Gujarati social order is further fragmented by a large number of religious, sectarian and caste 
disjunctions, and while a comprehensive account of these is beyond our scope, the descriptions 
of specific Gujarati communities in Dwyer’s, Warner’s and Knott’s chapters show how great that 
variation may be.
Sylhet District in north-east Bangladesh is the third-largest source of immigration from South 
Asia, and here Gardner and Shukur’s account breaks much new ground, since few other 
researchers have yet paid much attention to the Sylhetis. As already noted, Sylhet may be 
slightly more prosperous than other parts of Bangladesh, but it is still a great deal less so than 
Punjab or Gujarat. Partly because of this, the Sylhetis have moved more slowly from the 
sojourner to the settler phase than any other group; indeed, in their case family reunion is still 
taking place. Hence they are currently by far the poorest component of the South Asian presence 
in Britain, and also have the highest rate of population growth. 
Religion is also a major source of differentiation, and all of South Asia’s faiths are now 
represented in Britain. Of these the Muslims are by far the most numerous, since all the Sylhetis, 
over half the Punjabis, and perhaps a fifth of the Gujaratis are followers of Islam. Yet although 
Islam has now become a significant vehicle for collective mobilisation, as Shaw’s account of 
Pakistanis in Oxford, as well as Gardner and Shukur’s discussion of East London Sylhetis shows,
Islam in Britain is in fact far less homogeneous than outsiders commonly suppose, a point well 
underlined by Lewis’s analysis of sectarian developments in Bradford. Nor are these 
contradictions unique to the Muslims. Thus while Dwyer indicates that a parallel form of neo-
Hindu revivalism is attracting widespread interest in Britain, as it currently does in India itself, 
her focus on Hindu sectarianism also shows that Hindus are no more religiously united in Britain 
than they are in India itself. Caste and sectarian differentiation remains deeply entrenched, as — 
even more so — does the disjunction between the Gujarati majority and Punjabi minority. 
Ballard’s analysis of Sikh disunity takes up the same theme, while Nesbitt’s account of Valmiki 
revivalism shows how organised resistance to upper-caste hegemony leads to what can best be 
regarded as the creation of a whole new religion. Over and above the sectarian fragments of 
which the Sikh, Hindu and Muslim presence is constituted, South Asian migrants h ve also 
brought a number a smaller and less well-kno n religious traditions to Britain. Of these the Jams 
and the Zoroastrian Parsis are discussed in latter chapters; lack of space has forced us arbitrarily 
to exclude the Buddhists and the Indian Christians, who themselves embrace a wide range of 
diversities. Punjabi Protestants, Catholics from Goa, and Syrian Christians from South India 
have all formed small but very active ethnic colonies of their own.
As for social class, it has already been indicated that the vast majority of migrants were of 
rural rather than urban origin, and that most belonged to peasant farming families, though with a 
significant leaven of skilled craftsmen. On arrival in Britain the industrial jobs which migrants 
took led some analysts to identify them uncritically as “working-class”, but that term should be 
applied with caution. Structurally, settlers did indeed stand at the bottom of the ladder; but on the 
other hand their aspirations, strategies and expectations diff red sharply rom those of their white 
working-class neighbours. The social hierarchy of an Indian village cannot be mapped over that 
of urban industrial Britain. 
Even so, it is clear that although everyone started out at the bottom of the social order, some 
groups have achieved much more upward mobility than others. How is this to be accounted for? 
In crude statistical terms there is now evidence that British Muslims have attained a much lower 
average level of achievement than the Hindus and Sikhs, let alone the Jams and the Parsis. Given 
that Islam is popularly regarded as inculcating narrow-mindedness, inflexibility and 
authoritarianism among its followers, the obvious conclusion is often drawn: that the correlation 
must be causal. However this conclusi  cannot be sustained, above all because it fails to take 
any account of levels of economic development in the areas from which migrants have been 
drawn. Mirpur and Sylhet districts —from which the majority of Muslim migrants have been 
drawn — are relatively poverty-stricken, certainly as compared with West Punjab and Gujarat. It 
is this, rather than commitment to Islam per se, which accounts for most of those differentials. 
If differential levels of rural economic development have affected patterns of upward 
mobility, being of urban origin has had still greater impact. As we have seen, only a small 
proportion of the total inflow was made up of urbanites, but since most came with educational or 
professional qualifications of some sort, their expectations and aspirations were much higher. 
Most were therefore distressed to find that despite their hopes of a professional career, they were 
no better placed on the labour market than the villagers, and that there was little alternative to 
taking unskilled manual jobs. Despite the bitter humiliation which this entailed, few allowed 
their hopes to be entirely dashed. Some have since established themselves in professional 
careers, but many more have sidestepped exclusionism in the labour market by starting their own 
businesses — and have thus achieved upward social mobility. In the early days some of those 
successes were spectacular. As Hinnells recounts, the tiny Parsi community saw no less than 
three Members of Parliament elected from among its ranks in the early twentieth c ntury.
Later the situation became much tougher, and the experiences of the few people with 
professional qualifications who arrived in the midst of the much larger inflow of labour migrants 
were chequered.’17 Some, like the doctors, made progress toward  the middle ranks of their 
professional hierarchies. Promotion to more senior positions largely eluded them, however, and 
the experience of racial exclusionism has gradually led to a change in their adaptive strategies. In 
the early years of settlement most professionals made great efforts to distance themselves from 
the mass of their fellow-c untrymen and their ethnic colonies, hoping that their greater 
commitment to assimilation would serve to ward off exclusionism. However years of bitter 
experience has persuaded most of them to change their minds, so that in addition to the close ties 
they have long maintained among themselves, many South Asian professionals have established 
closer relationships with upwardly mobile labour-migrant families, especially f they are of 
similar regional, religious and caste origins. 
Migrants and Twice Migrants 
The final source of differentiation, which cuts across all the others discussed so far, is that 
between those who came directly to Britain from the subcontinent, and those who had previously 
lived elsewhere in the South Asian diaspora — a g oup which has been graphically dubbed by 
Parminder Bhachu as “Twice Migrants”.18 Bhachu herself is concerned solely with those twice-
migrants who arrived by way of East Africa. Besides forming by far the largest such group in 
Britain, they do appear to differ strikingly from their once-migrant peers. Besides being heavily 
involved in ethnic reonstruction long before their involuntary departure from East Africa, the 
circumstances of their arrival in Britain were quite different. Most entered as more or less 
complete family units, and they had by definition rejected the option of an immediate return to 
India. Hence they were settlers rather than sojourners right from the outset. In addition th y were 
also better equipped for economic survival: most had educational qualifications of some sort, 
many spoke English fluently, and most men (and some women) either had experience of 
professional, technical or commercial employment, or had run their own businesses before 
leaving Africa. 
Despite these advantages, East African Asians soon met the same problems of racial 
exclusionism as their once-migrant peers. Few were dispirited, however, and by dint of hard 
work, reinforced by skill, determination and mutual co-operation, they have made rapid progress, 
both in paid (and often professional) employment, and by starting their own businesses. Even 
though many families lost most of their savings during their involuntary departure from Africa, 
by common consent the East Africans now form the most prosperous segment of the South Asian 
presence in Britain. Yet although they tend to feel themselves to be a cut above the rest, it is 
uncertain how long this sense of East African and twice-migrant distinctiveness will be 
sustained. Despite their greater affluence and more “westernised” material lifestyles, they also 
have a strong commitment to religious and ethnic reconstruction, and are thus much less 
different from the other settlers than is commonly supposed, since they belong to the very same 
communities and castes as do the once-migrants. Thus while the African connection remains a 
source of pride and not a little prestige, its distinctiveness is inevitably fading. Kinship, caste and 
sect are proving far more effective as unifying agents than the experience of being a twice-
migrant. 
This is not true of all twice-migrants, however, as Vertovec’s chapter demonstrates. In sharp 
contrast to every other group disc ssed, the Indo-Caribbean population of Guyana and Trinidad 
did not move overseas as voluntary migrants, but were transported there as indentured labourers 
in conditions of near-sl very. They were part of a replacement labour force recruited after the 
formal abolition of slavery; many thousands of Indian “coolies” thus found themselves working 
for a pittance in a whole string of tropical colonies.t9 Given the harshness of their conditions of 
employment, the indentured labourers found it much more difficult to sustain a coherent sense of 
cultural continuity than did their free migrant counterparts, and Indo-Caribbeans therefore differ 
strikingly in their lifestyles from all other British South Asians. Their links with the subcontinent 
have become so attenuated that few retain fluency in their ancestral language, and many aspects 
of their speech and lifestyle have been heavily influenced by contact with their Afro-Caribbean 
neighbours. However in religious terms they still identify themselves as Hindus, even if their 
practices have been influenced by Protestant Christianity, while the significance of caste 
divisions — which are still salient within all other South Asian groups — is also much 
diminished. 
On the face of it, the Indo-Caribbeans differ sharply from everyone else, not least because for 
them those characteristics which the others regard as the very heart of their “Asianness” are 
severely atrophied. Yet it would be unwise to dismiss the Indo-Caribbean experience as wholly 
exceptional, for their adaptive strategies may well foreshadow the shape f thing  to come. 
Certainly, material conditions in contemporary Britain are much less adverse than those 
experienced by Caribbean cane-cutters, and cheap travel makes it easier for settlers to keep in 
touch with kin in the subcontinent; but the pressures to which the second and third generation in 
Britain are subjected, and their sense of distance from the subcontinent, echo the Indo-Caribbean 
experience. Before long their response to exile may seem much less aberrant than it does at 
present. 
Caste 
There is, however, one sphere in which no other groups have yet followed Indo-Caribbean 
practice: that of caste. As every subsequent chapter shows, caste remains a crucial feature of 
social organisation in almost every settlement. Yet despite its centrality, nothing provokes more 
bafflement and indignation among outsiders. It is therefore vital to look briefly at both the 
ideological foundations and the practical consequences of this most Indian of institutions. 
In ideological terms, both differentiation and he fu ctional interdependence of the component 
parts so differentiated is basic to the Hindu vision of the logic of the cosmic order. Hence the 
social order (which is itself viewed as a microcosm of the wider universe) is conceived of not as 
a collection of autonomous individuals all pursuing their own independent goals, but rather as a 
complex system of interdependence where every component makes its own unique but necessary 
contribution to the operation of the whole. What this means in practice is that Hindu socie y is 
seen as arising from the interactions between a multiplicity of occupational specialists, where 
Brahmins perform rituals to please the gods, kings rule, merchants trade, farmers cultivate their 
land, and craftsmen of many kinds exercise thei  skills, while polluted menials serve all their 
superiors by removing the impurities which the latter continuously accumulate as a result of 
cosmic, local and personal entropy.20 
Although this system emphasises cooperation and reciprocity, it is also explicitly hierarchical. 
Brahmins, as the epitome of ritual purity, stand at the top; rulers, traders, farmers and craftsmen 
are spread out along a steadily descending scale, down to groups right at the bottom which are 
often described as “Untouchable” — although “irretrievably impure” is a more exact term. 
Hence throughout the subcontinent the population of every village is divided between a number 
of hereditary, endogamous and occupationally linked groups known as zat or jati, or in English 
as castes. At least in principle, every such caste has a fixed and unchangeable rank, while its 
boundaries are maintained both by the hereditary ascription of occupational specialism and by a 
rule of endogamy which requires that all marriages must take place within the jati. Yet although 
the tight closure and lack of flexibility which all this implies often leads Western observers to 
conclude that the whole system is morally objectionable, a closer examination of how it actually 
operates shows that it is actually much more fluid than first impressions might suggest. 
First, each caste is a fully-fledged community of kin, whose members sustain horizontal links 
with like groups in neighbouring villages; and while individual mobility from one caste to 
another is unthinkable, collective mobility, where an entire locally-based jati moves upwards (or 
downwards) through the social scale, is indeed possible Nor is this new; there is widespread 
agreement that such collective mobility has always been a feature of the caste system. 
Seen in this perspective, caste solidarity is much less puzzling: its core feature is no more than 
a closing of ranks among those with common interests. Stripped of exoticism, caste reveals itself 
as a highly effective form of collective bargaining, and thus aki  to a system of guilds. However 
it gains a strongly Indian character because in this case occupational specialists use rules of 
endogamy and cornme sality to reinforce further the effectiveness of their closed shops. The 
nominal fixity of caste rank is therefore rather misleading. While change is rarely speedy, the 
rank ascribed to any caste ultimately depends on the effectiveness of its bargaining power within 
the immediate local context. Thus, as Dwyer shows for pre-British Gujarat, merchant castes took 
advantage of a political vacuum to engineer an improved rank for themselves; meanwhile Nesbitt 
provides equally clear evidence that those whose bargaining power declines can suffer exactly 
the opposite fate. 
The Dynamics of Caste in the Diaspora 
Although caste systems have always been more flexible in practice than the formal ideology 
suggests, it is still widely assumed that cornmercialisation, urbanisation and migration would 
inevitably undermine the whole system. Much has indeed changed. In urban India the formal 
division of labour and the resulting structures of interdepende ce have largely collapsed, and 
such patterns are even more alien to life in the diaspora. Yet in Britain as in urban India, caste 
disjunctions and caste loyalties are still almost as active as they ever were. 
Why should this be so? While the hereditary allocation of occupational speci lisation may 
have been swept away, the rules of endogamy are still just as strictly followed in the diaspora as 
in the subcontinent. As a result, all kinship networks remain firmly caste-spe ific. By itself this 
would be of little significance, were it not that kinship reciprocities still offer the most effective 
means of organising mutual support, especially in fiercely competitive urban environments. Thus 
whenever migrants have helped each other gain access to jobs, housing and other scarce 
resources, and whenever they have sought to protect their gains (however limited) from 
encroachment, they have invariably found that kinship ties provided the m st effective base for 
collective mobilisation. So although rapid economic change may indeed have eroded the caste 
system’s traditional foundations, it has been re-i vigorated by its role as a channel for kinship 
reciprocities, no less in Birmingham than in Bombay. 
The collapse of the traditional rank order has had a further paradoxical consequence: the 
intensification of inter-caste competition for status. As almost every subsequent chapter shows, 
many settlers are still almost obsessively concerned with issues of rank; members of “higher” 
castes still go to considerable lengths to preserve and maintain their status, while those further 
down the scale are if anythi g even more concerned to catch up. 
 
Caste, Religion and Sect 
Since caste is above all a Hindu ideological construct, and since the very idea is nominally 
repugnant to the Muslim, Sikh, Jam, Parsi and Indian Christian traditions, it might be thought 
that such a generalisation would not be widely applicable amongst non-Hindu settlers. In 
practice, however, few if any of the subcontinent’s non-Hi du c munities have remained 
immune from its influence. 
The Sikhs provide a good illustration. On a strictly theological level, the Sikhs can and do 
argue that their Gurus flatly rejected the id ology of caste. But despite this, neither the Gurus nor 
their followers seriously challenged either the hereditary ascription of occupaal spe ialism, 
or the principle of zat endogamy. And while those who followed the Gurus’ teaching may 
thereby have been able to discount the Brahmins’ claims to ritual superiority, their ideas about 
ritual impurity remained largely unchanged. From the viewpoint of those at the bottom of the 
pile, the conversion of their patrons to Sikhism made little difference; in the face of continued 
upper-caste chauvinism, many felt they had no alternative but to strike out separately on th ir 
own account, as Nesbitt shows for the Valmikis. 
Similar tendencies can also be observed among the Muslims, most of whom are also converts 
from Hinduism. In most rural communities occupational roles are still hereditarily ascribed, and 
give rise to zat divisions of a manifestly caste-like character, while the tendency towards closure 
is further reinforced by a widespread preference for cousin-marriage. Thus even though Muslims 
are much less bothered about rules of endogamy, their biraderis t nd to be even more tightly 
introverted than most jatis— and, as Shaw demonstrates, they are just as effective as vehicles 
for mutual support. 
Finally, if the Sikhs and Muslims are internally divided by caste, the Jams and the Parsis 
discussed by Banks and Hinnells offer a neat contrast. In this context both can be seen as acting 
as castes in their own right, for although they can and do argue that they ae no  concerned with 
issues of caste, each group has a long history of occupational specialisation, as well as a strong 
commitment to (religious) endogamy. Hence wherever one stands in the debate about whether it 
is legitimate to regard them as “castes”, ther  can be no dispute that Jain and Parsi strategies of 
closure have a strongly caste-like character. 
The Construction of South Asian Communities in Britain 
What consequences, then, has all this diversity had for the construction of De h Pardesh? 
Although there can be little doubt that settlers’ lifestyles have changed a great deal since their 
arrival in Britain, in understanding this adjustment two very different sets of factors must be 
borne in mind. On the one hand they have all followed a broadly similar strategy of rejecting 
assimilation, and have instead relied to a large extent on their own resources as a means of 
building themselves a home from home. But even though they have all therefore been following 
broadly parallel trajectories, each group as drawn on its own specific set of human and cultural 
resources while doing so. 
Given that those resources were themselves diverse, this has given rise to a wide range of 
outcomes. Close examination soon reveals much variation in the speed with which th switch 
from the sojourner to the settler mode has taken place, the kinds of housing they chose to live in 
and the jobs they were able and prepared to accept, and the vigour and success with which they 
sought to press their way upwards through the employment and housing markets and the 
educational system. As a result wide differences in achievement can often be observed between 
groups whose regional and occupational background might seem at first sight very similar. So, 
for example, the dual impact of differing levels of economic development back in the 
subcontinent, together with some arcane differences in marriage rules which might otherwise 
seem wholly insignificant, can help to explain the striking differences now observable between 
Jullunduri and Mirpun settlers, even though their homes lie little more than 100 miles apart in 
Punjab; if two relatively similar groups differ so much, it follows that we must expect a yet wider 
variation still amongst the South Asian population as a whole. 
This volume yet further underlines these diversities. As subsequent chapters show, “Asian” 
experience now ranges all the way from Sylheti families in Spitalfields, East London, crowded 
together in decaying council tenements and faced by high levels of unemployment a d racia  
harassment, to wealthy East African Gujarati Hindus who have moved into comfortable 
suburban neighbourhoods where they are courted by senior members of the Conservative Party, 
and some of whom were even invited to a special celebration dinner at 10 Dow ing S reet by 
Mrs Thatcher herself. Yet while any generalisation about “Asians” must take these variations 
into account, we still have far to go in understanding how they have arisen, let alone how 
permanent they will prove to be. Since all settlers hav  met similar patterns of structural 
constraint, such differences are manifestly the outcome of cultural factors. However, it would be 
a mistake to regard the less successful groups as suffering from a cultural handicap of any sort, 
onto see their present position as fixed and immutable. What every subsequent chapter serves to 
emphasise is not only how much every little community differs from the next, but also that each 
is following its own distinctive dynamic. From this perspective the members of each colony are 
best understood as being in the midst of a vigorous process of adaptation, and thus busily 
engaged in deploying their own particular set of cultural, linguistic, religious and kinship 
resources to plot a better future for themselves. The result is both steady progress and ever-
growing diversity. 
Those in search of simple generalisations will undoubtedly be disappointed by our approach, 
for we offer no instant nostrums and no simple and easily measurable variables. What we 
ourselves would argue is that if one adopts this kind of perspective, there is no simple way of 
understanding either the quality of South Asian lifestyles in Britain or the scale and character of 
the active solidarities which form the basis of any sense of community. Indeed once it is 
accepted that meaningful solidarities must be grounded in active networks, it follows that to talk 
of an “Asian” community — or even of “Indian”, “Pakistani” or “Bangladeshi” ones — is ft n
to reinforce a fiction. Real communities are much more parochially organised, and have been 
generated from the specific skills, understandings and loyalties which each little network makes 
available to its members. De h Pardesh — the embodiment of the self-created worlds of 
Britain’s South Asian settlers — is therefore anything but homogeneous; it is precisely the rich 
and diverse nature of its many faces which we seek to highlight here. 
Between Two Cultures? 
Before closing, this Introduction must also review the developments associated with the 
emergence of a British-born generation. While its members are certainly major contributors to 
the process of ethnic colonisation, they are also much more deeply involved in transactions 
across the ethnic boundary than their parents ever were. Almost all the significant social 
interactions of older settlers take place within the local ethnic colony; to be sure, it is hard to 
avoid any relationships at all with members of the indigenous majority, but when such trans-
actions do occur they are usually strongly instrumental in character, and re invested with little 
moral or emotional force. 
Their offspring, and more specifically those who have spent the greater part of their childhood 
in Britain, usually participate much more actively in the wider social order — at school and 
college, at work, and in a wide range of leisure activities. Hence in contrast to their parents they 
are constantly on the move between a wide variety of social arenas, which are often organised 
around differing, and sometimes radically contradictory, moral and cultural co ventions. 
How do they cope with this? To many outside observers, the answer seems obvious enough. 
Given that majority and minority value-systems differ so sharply, those young people who are 
expected to conform to both must constantly be struggling wi h the resulting contradictions, or so 
it is believed. Thus, for example, teachers, social workers and youth workers who regularly 
encounter South Asians among their clientele can often be heard discussing the insufferable 
contradictions which these young people are thought to face through being trapped “between two 
cultures”.21 Indeed this vocabulary has become so widespread that young Asians have themselves 
adopted it; instant sympathy can certainly be expected if they ascribe all their personal 
difficulties to their condition of “culture conflict”. 
Real though the dilemmas of the rising British-born generation may be, does this terminology 
enable their experiences to be adequately grasped? Does active participation in two or more 
social and cultral arenas necessarily cause psychological confusion? If not, what kind of 
analytical perspective should we use instead? 
Code Switching and Cultural Navigation 
Perhaps the best way in which we can make some progress here is by drawing an analogy 
between bilingualism and bi- and multi-culturalism, not just as attributes of the wider social 
order, but also in terms of the degree of linguistic and cultural competence which individuals 
may or may not possess. For most members of Britain’s monolingual majority, bilingualism 
remains an unusual and mysterious skill, of which they have little or no first-hand experience. 
Had their experience been more cosmopolitan, they might have been more aware that in global 
terms bilingualism is a far less unusual phenomenon than they suppose. More important still, the 
capacity to switch from one linguistic and conceptual code to another is not a recipe for 
psychological confusion. Quite the contrary: the ability to express oneself with equal fluency in 
two or more languages is a wholly normal human capacity, with which our brains can cope with 
ease. 
As with language, so with culture. Just as individuals can be bilingual, so they can also be 
multicultural, with the competence to behave appropriately in a number of different arenas, and 
to switch codes as appropriate. If this is so, the popular view that young people of South Asian 
parentage will inevitably suffer from “culture conflict” as a result of their participation in a 
number of differently structured worlds can be dismissed. Rather they are much better perceived 
as skilled cultural navigators, with a sophisticated capacity to manoeuvre their way to their own 
advantage both inside and outside the ethnic colony. While such a perspective radically 
transforms the conventional understanding of the experience of young British Asians, it would 
nevertheless be idle to suggest that code-swit hing is a means by which they can short-circuit all 
their problems and dilemmas. Far from it. Just because they do not follow a single given set of 
conventions, all cultural navigators must constantly decide how best to behave in any given 
context, while also finding some means of switching smoothly from one to the next. 
While such strategic decisions can indeed be difficult, to call them “culture conflict” is surely 
mistaken. If that culture were in some way a comprehensive determinant of behaviour, an 
individual’s participat on in two different arenas might indeed give rise to irresolvable 
contradictions. But multiculturalism freezes behaviour no m re than bilingualism inhibits 
speech. Cultures, like languages, are codes, which actors use to express themselves in a given 
context; and as the context changes, so those with the requisite competence simply switch code. 
In this perspective a switch of arena, along with an associated switch of linguistic and cultural 
codes, can be quite straightforward. But problems may arise when one is known to have witched 
codes, and where behaviour in the second arena takes a form which is regarded as unacceptable 
from the perspective of the first. For example, if many Asian parents knew exactly how their 
daughters behaved once safely out of sight at school or college, they would be horrified — just 
as those same young women would be equally embarrassed if thei English school-friends were 
more aware of how they behaved once they re- n ered the ethnic colony. Thus, codeswitching is 
much more a problem for the beholders than for the actors themselves. Hence if one can keep all 
the arenas in which one is an actor apart, so that information does not flow inappropriately and 
unexpectedly from one to the next, no problems will arise. When difficulties do occur, they are 
more likely to be a result of unexpected information leakage than of code-switching in itself. 
Such code-switching is of course not unique to South Asians, or even to immigrants, for one 
can expect to encounter such activities in all contexts of cultural plurality, no matter how lightly 
marked. But although code switch is best regarded as a universal phenomenon — for few people 
live in such a homogeneous world that they have no experience whatsoever of stepping back and 
forth across such boundaries — such navigational skills are far from uniformly distribute . 
Because a central privilege of dominance is the power to insist that all one’s interactions should 
be ordered on one’s own terms, it is members of excluded and devalued groups who have a far 
greater need to develop and use such skills. 
Yet although most young Britons of South Asian descent have therefore b come very skilled 
in moving back and forth between all manner of “English” and “Asian” arenas, they still face all 
sorts of dilemmas. These arise not so much because the underlying value-pr mises of the arenas 
in which they participate are differnt, but rather because each side has such a markedly negative 
perception of the other — as we saw at the outset. 
This contradiction has far-re ching consequences, Because most aspects of their domestic 
lifestyles are viewed so negatively by the native English, most young Asians find themselves 
under constant pressure to distance themselves from their parents’ and their communities’ 
linguistic, religious and cultural conventions. It is therefore hardly surprising that many go out of 
their way to present themselves as if majority lifestyles were also their own preferred option 
whenever they feel themselves to be in sight of a white audience. Yet few feel wholly relaxed in 
such a role. First, presenting oneself in this way is always in a sense a living lie, since it entai s a 
constant denial of the legitimacy and validity of one’s heritage, and of the warm emotional 
support offered by one’s family and kin. Secondly skin colour remains an inescapable barrier. No 
matter how well-practised one’s navigation l skills, the prospect of being written off as a “Paid” 
can never be eliminated. Total acceptance is therefore out of the question.
Yet if participation in majority arenas is beset by contradictions, most young people are involved 
in battles of the very opposite kind on their own home territory. These are much more complex 
than most outsiders imagine. Contrary to pessimistic external assumptions, few young people 
experience any difficulty in conforming to their parents’ styles and expectations within the four 
walls of their home: besides the large debt of gratitude they feel they owe to their elders, the 
values with which they are expected to conform are those into which they have been socialised 
since childhood. By contrast, difficulties are far more likely to arise over young people’s extra-
domestic activities, as when worried and over- uth ritarian parents take the view that even the 
smallest infiltration of English norms will result in a swift and comprehensive slide into 
anglicisation, especially where daughters are concerned. The resulting conflicts are played out in 
a wide variety of ways, but the results are rarely as disastrous as external observers predict; if 
parents are prepared not to ask too searching questions, and their offspring are prepared to do 
their code-switching well out of sight of their elders, some wide contradictions can be bridged 
with surprising ease. 
Yet although similar “blind-eye” strategies can also be observed on the other side of the ethnic 
boundary, it would be wrong to conclude that cultural navigators will always conform to the 
norms expected in their immediate environment, or even that they are faced with a straight 
choice between majority and minority codes. On the contrary, strategic advantages can often be 
gained by those who deliberately code their behaviour inappropriately. For example, young men 
or women who begin to act in an over-anglicised way at home may well simply be seeking to 
assert themselves: efforts to resist parental hegemony should not be misread as “culture conflict”. 
Exactly the reverse of this process occurs when young people set out to make space for 
themselves in majority contexts. Hence to switch “inappropriately” into Urdu or Punjabi speech, 
to wear a turban or shalwar kamiz, to condemn the publication of The Satanic Verses, to praise 
arranged marriages — or indeed to reject any other aspect of Western orthodoxy — is a 
particularly effective way of re-establishing personal dignity in the face of racial and ethnic 
denigration. To interpret such behaviour as psycho-pathological, as a vocabulary of “culture 
conflict” and “identity crisis” inevitably suggests, is seriously misleading, for the essentially 
political dimension of these interactions is thereby obscured. 
Desh Pardesh Renews Itself: The Younger Generation 
Exploring the behavioural strategies of the rising British-born generation takes us into a world of 
considerably greater complexity than that inhabited by its parents. As we have seen — and as 
every subsequent chapter further emphasises — the oldr generation of migrants’ commitment to 
ethnic colonisation largely reflected an intense concern to insulate domestic and personal life 
from the perceived corrosive impact of the social and cultural mores of the host society. Yet even 
though the surrounding environment may have had far more influence on settlers’ lifestyles than 
they themselves are aware of, the boundaries around their own domestic worlds are still sharply 
drawn. In these circumstances a descriptive account which regards life within such internal 
“Asian” arenas as being grounded in cultural premises which are entirely separate from those of 
the surrounding white majority may cut some analytical corners, but it does so without too much 
injustice to empirical reality. 
Once we turn to the rising generation of young adults, however, such an approach ceases to be 
sustainable. First, the internal/external distinction almost disappears: those who have grown up in 
Britain are as much at ease in many majority environments as they are within the ethnic colony,
and their everyday lives involve constant movement between a wide variety of differently 
structured arenas. But such manoeuvres give rise to much more than a simple either/or choice. 
Young British Asians may indeed be just as much at home in their pare ts’ world as they are 
among their white peers, but at the same time they are actively and creatively engaged in carving 
out new styles of interaction among themselves. Thus it is also apparent that members of the 
rising generation are best understoo  a  extremely mobile in linguistic, religious and cultural 
terms, and often taking delight in drawing eclectically on every tradition available to them. In 
this respect the musical inventiveness of Apache Indian, the Birmingham-born pop star whose 
ironic lyrics seamlessly mixing English with Punjabi are declaimed rap-style against a beat 
which itself weaves bhangra with reggae, may well be a pointer to the future. 
With the younger generation bringing further layers of differentiation over and above those 
introduced by the first generation of migrants, any attempt to present a general overview of 
current dev lopments is hazardous. Yet there is one point on which we can be clear. Most of the 
rising generation are acutely aware of how much they differ from both their parents a d from the 
surrounding white majority, and as a result they are strongly committed to ordering their own 
lives on their own terms. Just what those terms will be, and how they will rejig and reinterpret 
and reinvent the premises on which they choose to organise their lives, is yet to be seen. But the 
vigour with which young people insist that “We’re British and we’re here to stay” makes it clear 
that the commitment to building Desh Pardesh is in no way limited to the first generation. 
 
© Roger Ballard 1994 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Mohammed Anwar, The Myth of Return: Pakistanis in Britain (London: Heineman Educational 
Books, 1979) 
2 See Cohn Holmes, A Tolerant Country?: immigrants, refugees and minorities in Britain 
(London: Faber, 1991). 
3 Rosina Visram, Ayahs, Lascars and Princes (London: Pluto. 1986). 
4 Salter, The Asiatic in London (London: Seely, 1873) provides many illuminatng det ils of 
seamen in the late nineteenth century. Paul Fryer, Staying Power: the history of black people in 
Britain (London: Pluto, 1984) offers a masterly overview. 
 
5 Roger Ballard and Virinder Singh Kalra, The Ethnic Dimensions of the 1991 Census 
(Manchester University: Manchester Census Group, 1994). 
 
6 The figures in the final column are the most reliable, since they are based on responses to a 
genuine ethnic question. The figures in the preceding columns are “best estimates”, based either 
on country of birth data (1961 and 1971), or data on residents in households headed by persons 
born in the countries specified (1981).
7 Bangladesh only broke away from Pakistan after the 1971 civil war, so separate figures for 
Bangladeshis are only available from 1981 onwards. 
8 No reliable figures for East African Asians are available for 1961. By 1991, when an ethnic 
question was posed, the majority of East African Asians appear to have identified themselves as 
Indian. 
9 Excellent accounts of this early period can be found in Gurdip Aurora, The New F ontiersmen 
(Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1967), and in Reshmi Desai, Indian Immigrants in Britain (Oxford 
University Press, 1963). 
 
10 Badr Dahya’s account of “The nature of Pakistani ethnicity in Industrial cities in Britain”, in 
Abner Cohen (ed.), Urban Ethnicity (London: Tavistock, 1974)) gives an excellent portrait of 
lifestyles during this period. 
 
11 A more detailed exploration of the factors underlying differential rates of family reunion can 
be found in Roger Ballard, “Emigration in a wider context”, New Comunity, 1983, and in 
Roger Ballard “Migration and Kinship” in Cohn Clarke (ed.), South Asians Overseas 
(Cambridge University Press, I 990). 
 
12 This has confused many sociological commentators, for in “objective” terms the new 
minorities have given and often still give every appearance of suffering from severe deprivation. 
But appearances can be deceptive. Because most South Asian settlers have studiously avoided 
the values of consumer capitalism, they have survived adversity far more successfully than their 
white working-class peers. 
 
13 Both Parminder Bhachu, T e Twice Migrants (London: Tavistock, 1986), and Pnina Werbner, 
The Migration Process (London: Berg, 1989) provide detailed accounts of well-established 
South Asian communities, with a particular emphasis on the elaborate processes of gift exchange 
which now accompany marriage among East African Ramgarhia Sikhs on the one hand, and 
affluent Pakistani businessmen on the other. 
 
14 While the 1991 Census figures quoted earlier give a much more accurate estimate than ever 
before of the total size of Britain’s South Asian population, the numbers are of little help when it 
comes to making a more precise regional and religious breakdown. 
15 A useful introduction to the events of this period can be found in Khushwant Singh, A History
of the Sikhs (Oxford University Press, 1991).  
16 Patricia Jeffery, Migrants and Refugees (Cambridge University Press, 1976) provides an 
excellent account of Pakistani Christians and some of their dilemmas. 
 
17So much research has been devoted to charting the experiences of the labour-migrant majority 
that those of the professional minority have been largely overlooked. In the United States this 
pattern is reversed, and the experiences of its mostly professional settlers is ably charted in 
Arthur itnd Usha Helweg, An Immigrant Succe.cs Story (L ndon: Hurst, 1991) 
 
18  Parminder Bhachu, ibid. 
 
19 A detailed account of the itdenture system can be found in Hugh Tinker, A New Syst m of 
Slavery (Oxford University Press, 1974). 
 
20 Excellent accounts of the formal logic of the caste system can be found in Louis Dumont, 
Homo Hierarchicus (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), and in Declan Quigley, The 
Interpretation of Caste (Oxford University Press, 1991). 
 
21 It is also most unfortunate that an earlier and extremely influential compendium on the 
minority presence in Britain, James Watson’s Between Two Cultures (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), 
used this phrase in its title. The term therefore appeared to have been given academic and 
analytical credence, even though none of the contributors to that volume made any further use of 
it. 
 
 
